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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BENNETT WITHDREW AS A MEMBER OF ME&LS BY
VOLUNTARILY TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT.
A.

Bennett's Employment.
Appellee Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") fails to challenge or even comment

upon the definition of the word "employment" as advanced in the Brief of Appellant.
The word "employment" is not defined in Amendment No. 2 to the Operating Agreement
("Second

Amendment")

of McNeil

Engineering

and Land

Surveying, LLC

("ME&LS"). The Second Amendment gives ME&LS and the other members an option
to purchase the membership interest of one who withdraws, and then states as follows:
(a) For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be
deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or
terminates the Member's employment with the Company for
reasons other than bankruptcy, death, disability or
incompetency.
(R. 6620 (emphasis added).) ME&LS cited Utah case law, statutes, and a dictionary
source supporting a broad definition of "employment" which includes Bennett's leased
employment at ME&LS. Bennett does not challenge any of these authorities or cite any
contrary authority.
Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that the word
"'Employment' is broadly defined and liberally construed" in Utah law. Pro-Benefit
Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 111 P.2d
1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). A broad interpretation and liberal
1

construction of the word "employment" surely includes leased employment, especially
under the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment.1 Bennett
does not contest the rule of interpretation enunciated in Pro-Benefit. Rather, he tries to
distinguish the facts of Pro-Benefit and to side-step this Court's broad rule of
interpretation.

(Aplee. Br. at 11-13.)

ME&LS also cited two Utah statutes which

illustrate that leased employees are in the "employment" of the entity where their work is
done.

See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(3)(a) ("the client . . . is considered the

employer" of a leased employee), and Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(25) (the term
"member" of the Utah State Retirement System "includes leased employees . . ..")
Bennett does not respond to this argument either.
ME&LS also cited a dictionary definition which states that the word
"employment" means the "activity in which one engages or is employed." MerriamWebster Online, http://www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary. This Court has held that
a dictionary definition is a "helpful guide" to the interpretation of "common, daily, nontechnical speech" used in contracts and statutes. Mesa Development Co., Inc. v. Sandy
City Corp., 948 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Bennett does not challenge or
contest this dictionary definition nor does he respond to Mesa Development.
Moreover, Bennett fails to even mention much less contest the applicability
of the Cafe Rio decision. Many Utah cases state the general principle that the Court must
1

ME&LS leased all of its employees from MEL Bennett was an employee of MEI who
was leased to and worked only for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585, 6628.) The Second
Amendment was adopted some five years after ME&LS was formed, and each member
who signed it was a leased employee of ME&LS. (R. 6618-6622.)
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For all of those reasons this Court should broadly interpret and liberally
construe the word "employment" in the Second Amendment to include leased
employment, such that Bennett's voluntary termination was a withdrawal which triggered
ME&LS' right to repurchase his membership interest.
B.

Bennett Voluntarily Terminated His Employment.
The operative language of the Second Amendment says "a Member shall be

deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's
employment with the Company . . .." (R. 6620 (emphasis added).) Bennett argues he
"resigned his employment from . .. MEI" (Aplee. Br. at 2) but he blindly refuses to admit
that the resignation "terminate[d]" his leased employment with ME&LS.

Bennett

testified that, after ME&LS was formed at the end of 1996, he did all of his work for
ME&LS. (R. 2569.) Bennett also admits he has not worked for ME&LS or any of the
McNeil companies since his resignation in August 2005. (R. 6588.) Thus, it is clear that
Bennett's resignation terminated his leased employment with ME&LS, where he did all
of his work from December 31, 1986 to August 17, 2005.
Moreover, it is also clear that Bennett left voluntarily. His resignation letter
of August 17, 2005 (the "Resignation Letter") says "I believe that it is in my best
interest to leave the company and pursue other options." (R. 6630.) Bennett does not try
to suggest he left involuntarily. The Resignation Letter makes clear he left "for reasons
other than bankruptcy, death, disability or incompetency." (R. 6620, 6630.) Bennett's
insistence that he resigned only from MEI, therefore, ignores the fact that his resignation

4

"voluntarily . . . terminate[d]" his leased employment with and all of his work for
ME&LS.
C

Bennett's Resignation Letter.
Bennett also fails to challenge or respond to ME&LS5 argument about the

effect of the Resignation Letter upon the Court's interpretation of the Second
Amendment. This Court has held that "A construction given to a contractual provision
by the acts and the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any
controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will when
reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court." Okelberry v. West Daniels Land
Association, 2005 UT App 327, ^16, 120 P.3d 34 (emphasis added).
Bennett's Resignation Letter asks for a repurchase of his membership in
ME&LS. It reads: ". . . I feel it fair that I receive at least current book value for my 252
interests (at least $695/interest) in a timely manner."

(R. 6631.)

This statement

undermines Bennett's arguments before this Court. The Resignation Letter is a tacit
admission that Bennett knew it would trigger the repurchase of his membership interest
in ME&LS. The act of demanding repurchase of his membership interest "in a timely
manner" thus reflects Bennett's own interpretation of the Second Amendment, which
should be given "great weight." There would be no right or obligation to repurchase
Bennett's membership interest unless his resignation was a "withdrawal" as defined in
Section 12.3(a) of the Second Amendment. "For purposes of this Section, a Member
shall be deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the
Member's employment with the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, death,
5

disability or incompetency." (R. 6620.) The Resignation Letter was made "before any
controversy [had] arisen as to [the] meaning" of Section 12.3(a). Okelberry, 2005 UT
App 327, Tfl6. As such it "is entitled to great weight, and will when reasonable, be
adopted and enforced by the Court." Id.
Bennett does not challenge or even reference this argument in his Brief. He
offers no citation to the record suggesting the Resignation Letter means something else.
He also does not contest the rule of interpretation stated in Okelberry. Therefore, this
issue is uncontested before the Court. For these reasons the Court should conclude that
Bennett's resignation was a withdrawal under Section 12.3(a) which gave ME&LS the
right to repurchase his membership interest.
D.

Bennett's Other Arguments.
Bennett also makes other arguments which ignore the central issue before

the Court. For example, he contends the definition of "Company" as ME&LS should end
the Court's analysis. (Aplee. Br. at 3.) The definition is not disputed, but the argument
fails to acknowledge the need for the Court to determine whether Bennett's work for
ME&LS constituted "employment" and if it was voluntarily terminated by his
resignation. Additionally, Bennett contends that the rights and duties of an employee of a
corporation "differ markedly" from the rights and duties of a member of an LLC. (Aplee.
Br. at 9.) This argument once again misses the point. The Court still must interpret the
provision of the Second Amendment by which Bennett agreed that the voluntary
termination of his employment triggers the Company's right to repurchase his
membership interest.
6

In short, the arguments in Bennett's Brief merely wander in the periphery
and fail to address the core issues before the Court on this appeal.

POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED
ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT.
If this Court affirms the District Court's interpretation of the word
"employment," the Court nevertheless should hold that the Judgment was improperly
entered because of genuine issues of fact in the record. ME&LS presented this argument
in its principal brief (Aplt. Br. at 33-35) and Bennett fails to respond to it. Thus, it is
uncontested before the Court that there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Bennett
was entitled to a share of "guaranteed payments" from ME&LS and as to whether the
Plaintiffs' damages claims more than offset Bennett's claims.

Therefore, in the

alternative, the Court should vacate the Judgment and Orders below because of genuine
issues of material fact.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should apply governing principles of Utah law
by broadly and liberally interpreting the common, ordinary meaning of the word
"employment," and by giving effect to all provisions of the Operating Agreement and the
Second Amendment and ignoring none of them.

The Court should conclude that

Bennett's resignation terminated his leased employment with ME&LS and triggered his
withdrawal as a member. Based thereon, the Court should reverse the Judgment and the
7

Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. Alternatively, the Court should reverse
the Judgment because there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Bennett is entitled to
a share of guaranteed payments made to ME&LS members, and as to whether any such
amount would be offset by Plaintiffs' damages claims against Bennett.
DATED this *£_ day of April, 2011.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER
& NELSON

iTTHEWC.BARNECK
Attorneys for Appellant
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